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Preface
This essay comes from reading and studying works and au
thors of the literary tradition called “continental philosophy,” a school
of critical thought as artistic as it is academic. Never limiting itself to a
particular body of writing, continental philosophy allows the thinker to
liberally address issues of morality, sociology, psychology, and ontology
across texts, from literary fiction to political theory. The mythology and
philosophy of the West’s antiquity, studies of the Bible, and early mod
ern human analyses (anthropology, psychoanalysis, etc.) are of particu
lar interest to this school. The purpose of this interdisciplinary and often
baffling pursuit: to question what we think and how we think. In this
mode of thought, questioning what we believe to be true is always more
important than positing some new claim to truth.
Like much of philosophy, the continental school spends as
much effort revisiting and critiquing itself and its own thinkers as it does
developing new branches of thought. Critique is a way of expanding
a thought and taking it in new directions, introducing new themes and
possibilities to test against and make trial of the old. This form of argu
ment can be a disagreement between one author or idea and another,
but often critique is more an academic attempt to expand an idea
beyond where it has been taken thus far—to create new meanings and
questions. Critique makes philosophical thought inexhaustible, always
refining and exploring.
Jacques Derrida is the subject of the present essay’s critique.
He is a French thinker prominent in what is called Deconstruction, a
sub-school that refines ideas by taking apart the use, choice, and mean
ing of language used to express them (Levinas was Derrida’s contem
porary, and both French Jews). The essay reflexively adopts some of his
style. It is further influenced by the Italian philologist Giorgio Agamben,
who observes the historical issues of politics, philosophy, and theology.
Both are aleady concerned with the political theorists Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Carl Schmitt, whose thought on power and legality
played a role in the philosophy of the Nazi party. Ovid, the Roman poet
and cataloguer of so many stories that have informed Western thought,
and Herman Melville are also common interests in critical theory, but I
have taken the liberty of introducing Mr. Stewart and Dr. Anthony whose
honest observations and academic research, respectively, of the ancient
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cultures of the old world easily find their place in this question human
identity and power.
Topically, this essay is about exploring human power by ques
tioning some of its underlying human mechanisms, thus calling into
question non-human (animal) elements, all while having a little fun. Key
in the opening of this discourse is the French bete, which means “ani
mal” and “stupid,” from the Latin brutus, whose English sister is the
word “brutal” or “brute.” The scope of the project leaves out so many
considerations, which is why it is limited to an experimental critique of a
particular passage posed by Derrida. In spirit, however, this text is a kind
of game at language and ideas that, nevertheless, should be taken a bit
seriously.
§1 Loomings
David Attenborough selects a hauntingly violent series of stock
footage to include in his special documentary on wolves, depicting their
slaughter in the wild. A pair of hunters looms by helicopter over one
animal trailing through a thin wood (fig. 1). When the marksman makes
his shot, the wolf turns instinctively to confront its backbiter, and find
ing nothing there, instead flails and
howls in the snow, gnawing its own leg
in its death throes (fig. 2). The rifleman,
several hundred feet In the air, unseen,
untouched, barely heard, looms omnipresently and terrifyingly In such a
way Derrida might call a pas de loup,
stealthily. ‘Walking like the wolf is, to
Derrida, proper to the sovereign who
causes great anxiety—we never know
Fig.l: Hunters looming;
what/who it is, how many there are,
and where it lies. Spreading open the wolf below.
language of a pas de loup (that, with
minute shifts in wording, can suddenly
take on drastic new meanings), we begin to see the fundamentals of
sovereignty with which Derrida sets up his explorations in The Beast &
The Sovereign. Really, “there is no wolf [pas de loup] yet where things
are looming a pas de loup, the wolf Is not there yet [le loup n’y est pas]...
there is only a word... a fable, a fable-wolf, a fabulous animal” (5). Just
how real can we allow this fabulous animal-sovereign to be? Derrida
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places the sovereign, and in doing so also characterizes it, saying.
Like God, the sovereign is above the law and above humani
ty, above everything, and he looks a bit stupid [bete], he looks
like the beast, and even like the death he carries with him,
that death that Levinas says is not
nothingness, nonbeing, but nonre
sponse. (57)
Looming over us, hovering
above law, Derrida’s sovereign is
derived from Carl Schmitt’s “decisive
entity, [that] is sovereign in the sense
that the decision about the critical
situation, even if it is the exception,
must always necessarily reside there
Fig. 2: A wolf, shot.
[j ©. in sovereignty alone]” (Schmitt,
38), but it is also always a wolf, a
werewolf. At some point, we realize that we must discover where this
tabular monster came from and we must know if Derrida’s sovereign or
if something else entirely is what is really looming in a position of power
over man. All the while, we will be haunted by the fact that this wolf may
in fact be no wolf, or, more precisely, it is “the insensible wolf” (Derrida,
6). Insensibility is ‘without sense’ but also is ‘not sensed:’ not being seen
and not being heard (stealthy). When we call for it or name it, it does
not respond, and its silence Is what looms and gives it mystical proper
ties. The nonresponse, to eyes or ears, engenders fear and fable. We
must ask why the sovereign is response-less and what it means in not
responding. To critique this sovereign is to open up its nonresponsivity,
to find out why it is so stupid (brutal, cruel, and mute), to track it back
to where it originates, and to discover if the exceptional position Derrida
has assigned sovereignty seems proper to the sovereign and acceptable
to the humanity over which it has authority.
§2 A Historical Dignity
History is the study of signs or traces by which a hunter can fol
low a trail (or genealogy) back to the origins of his subject’s purpose or
nature. Tracking this stealthy wolf, Derrida invents the genelycology “to
know how to deal with the wolf,” to appropriately address and trace
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(or outline) these wolf-men and wolf-sovereigns that lurk in his “book of
wolves” (64). Derrida’s anthropolycology, of men and wolves, is like Carl
Schmitt’s very anthropological real politik, a political theory preoccupied
with the history of man, his original evil, and how his politics must be
defined by his sinful propensity (Derrida 44). Derrida is preoccupied with
the history of man and his original wolfishness. Perhaps, since Hobbes
(to whose tradition Schmitt belongs) and Rousseau (who vigorously and
critically responds to Hobbes’s Leviathan with The Social Contract) alike
have defined the sovereign as the corporate body politic of men made
by men, our historicity of the sovereign should be concerned with how
man fundamentally defines himself. Setting aside the origins of sin and
its extensive body of Christian theology, let us concern ourselves with
this original wolfishness and how the animal involves itself in man’s selfidentity, his own body, and his political body.
Taxonomy is always a genealogical system of classification that
wants to trace connections and give names to otherwise mysterious
subjects in an effort to make them understandable and, necessarily, de
mystified. Such an effort is always dubious. A tradition of understanding
by the violence of designation, dissecting, and removing environmen
tal contexts can only make its subject known by the language (name,
genus, kingdom, type, etc.) that the observer forces upon it. Whether or
not this institutionalization and categorization is a true revealing or mak
ing known of the subject’s nature (if this is even possible), and whether
or not these taxonomically fabricated creatures with names are real is
always debatable. Exploring early developments in this accounting and
science of origins, Giorgio Agamben plies into the problem that the hu
man taxonomic designation. Homo sapiens, is the ape without specific
identification. Traditionally, man is the animal with the sole characteristic
that he is man only when he recognizes himself as such [nosce te Ipsum], and Agamben calls this self-identifying formula ‘the anthropologi
cal machine’ in The Open: Man and Animal. Beginning §8, titled ‘Without
Rank,’ he says.
The anthropological machine of humanism is an ironic ap
paratus that verifies the absence of a nature proper to Homo,
holding him suspended between a celestial and a terrestrial
nature, between animal and human—and, thus, his being
always less and more than himself. (29; my emphasis)
Suspending the terms “human” and “inhuman” in the anthropological
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machine, man seeks to define himself by a separating of man and ani
mal , perhaps in fear of the possibility of a werewolf, the monster that is
both. Agamben addresses, here in this discourse on proper to, the mat
ter of dignity, “which [he says] simply means ‘rank,’ and could not in any
case refer to man.” This man without rank, who has no rank to fall into,
is a man without place whose betweenness leaves him stranded in the
Animal Kingdom, yet stricken by God’s image. Perhaps ‘dignity’ refers
to this unranked betweenness between men, and, more importantly, the
authority that facilitates it. The Latin dignus, i.e. “worth, worthy, proper,
fitting,” might suggest such an authority. The word originates in the
Proto-Indo-European root *dek- “to take, [and] to accept” (Harper). At
the foundation of this facilitation of the authority that betweenness car
ries will be the facilitation of taking and accepting, which does not refer
to men, but what is between them.
Borges reminds us in his bestiary that Sihddartha Gautama was
prophesied by a mystical white elephant to either save men as the great
est of souls, or rule men as the greatest of lords. The Buddha chose the
former, and by fasting and eschewing earthliness did he transcend. The
temptation of Christ may not have had such similar results had this dia
bolic debate on self-identity not taken place in the emptiness of a desert
between places, or, more importantly, while he was neither taking nor
accepting food. These saviors of men, in their emptiness, neither take
nor accept.
§3 The Orality of Fear
Derrida horribly imagines, “it is as though, through the maw of
the untamable beast, a figure of the sovereign were to appear” (18), as
he begins to approach, in The Beast & the Sovereign, the issues of both
roguishness and orality. The oral, for Derrida, is a colossal subject of
love, words, breath, and spirit or animus. Politically, the mouth is the or
gan of the body’s passage that can open to speak, a sending forth; or to
devour, a taking in. Orality is the feral jaws of a starving wolf and it is the
source of sovereign pronouncement and policy. The lips can be open
in gesticulation, or sealed in non-response. The sovereign that is silent
but wolfish will always find its nature in orality: how it rules and where it
comes from. The issue is as deep as the abyssal gut into which it leads.
Greeks imagined the time before order, vast and empty, as chaos or
khaino, the yawn (Harper). This is the unknown and irrational region from
which Derrida’s sovereign springs, and with his own mouth irresponsibly
gluts himself like some swine or wolf or other animal. Conceptualize a
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king that has, through his lips, drank too much—he is blind-drunk and
less responsible in his stupor. His actions will be random and potentially
terrible. His subjects might prefer him dead, yet he must still be obeyed
for the void of his absence will bring upheaval and disorder. An oral sov
ereign is, in Derrida’s book of wolves, animalistic and wild, who knows
that:
One must show oneself to be blind, make it known that one
can be blind and stupid [bete] in the choice of targets, just so
as to be frightening and have the enemy believe that one is
acting at random, that one goes crazy when vital interests are
affected. (89)
The not-knowing of the sovereign’s intentions is just as frightening as
not knowing his shape or his location (or if he is actually there). This
particular passage arises in Derrida’s commentary on U.S. foreign policy.
Every possibility looms in and preoccupies the minds of the enemies
and the subjects of the sovereign, and anxiety ensues. Derrida believes
that the intelligence of US Strategic Command (Stratcom) is the direc
tive to prevent the sovereignty that it represents from ever seeming too
rational to its enemies, to make an “image of an adversary”, he says,
“who always might do just anything” (89).
‘Loomings’ is also Melville’s title for the first chapter of his
Moby-Dick. It is always the whale, “withholding from sight the full terrors
of his submerged trunk, entirely hiding the wrenched hideousness of his
jaw” (409), that preoccupies the whale hunters—Ahab most of all. Thou
sands of words can be said of jaws and of sovereignty in this leviathanic
tome (e.g. sailors must pass through a pair of whale’s jaws to reach the
barroom in New Bedford to get their first shoreside drink), but it is clear
that the colossal mouth of the whale, like the bared fangs of a wolf, is an
item of the concealed, of the insatiable, of the greatest fear. Subjects of
this orality of fear never know when they will be eaten nor when some
impossible edict will be uttered. Like the outlaw or rogue that, outside
the law, takes what he pleases, like the brutal wolf that thieves the shep
herd’s flock, Derrida’s sovereign is excluded from civil society because
he is cruel and hungry, and is cruel and hungry because he is outside of
the city. This sovereign transgresses the laws (those political boundar
ies) and, disregarding them, crosses, as a wolf crosses fences. Doing
so, according to Schmitt, the sovereign creates a sovereign law. This is
an exclusive sovereign that takes without accepting (as a gift) by means
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of its powerful anxiety.
Protego ergo obligo [protection therefore obedience] is at the
foundation Schmitt’s state that is served so as to protect. It “is the
cogito ergo sum [I think, therefore I am] of the state” (Schmitt, 52).
The constituent’s obligation to his body politic (the state) is at once a
reflexive gratitude for being protected, but more importantly a fear of
being vulnerable. For Derrida, fear of no-state and fear of state is the
doubled fear of this obligation. The subjects cannot imagine how to
protect themselves without the state or from the state itself. The horrific
Leviathan of the Hobbes-Schmitt-Derridian legacy is the man-made and
sovereign “Artificial Soul... giving life and motion to the body [politic]”
(Derrida, 28). The very spirit or animus [animal] of that artificial soul is
this; “Sovereignty causes fear, and fear makes the sovereign” (40). At
first, this appears remarkably similar to Rousseau’s persona ficta (a fic
tion of or formulation by the collective or “general” will of the subjects
of the state) that demands “an obligation to something of which one is
a member” (62). Indeed, the sovereign “General Will” within his Social
Contract has the right to grant life and death to members of the as
semblage: “Whoever wishes to preserve his own life at the expense of
others must give his life for them when it is necessary” (78). However,
Rousseau’s sovereign requires an additional identification in that it is an
entity that “can act only when the people are assembled” (136). Only
in an assembly of men can this sovereign be readily and repeatedly
re-affirmed. In between each who has gathered is an argument or an
agreement, and out of this a state is conjured and made real.
This sovereign that springs from the orality of the collective
agreement, between each mouth, that Rousseau initiates for us seems
so fragile without that bestial authority that Derrida relies upon so heav
ily. Yet, its strength lies in reciprocal obligation instead of a doubled fear.
Unlike the sovereign that springs from the orality of fear, this sovereignty
obliges its subjects to its protection, but it is obliged to its subjects for
substantiation and reality, and in this relation the persona ficta facili
tates the responsibility of one speaker to another, proposing and agree
ing, calling and responding, even in its own nonresponse. The persona
ficta facilitates the authority of the betweenness found among the men
who make it. If that authority is not found in the bestial exclusion that it
seems to oppose, it must be found and related to the dignity of taking
and accepting.
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§4 Lycaon
By exception, by bestiality, by being exceptional, becominganimal, becoming-exceptional, the exceptional sovereign is like the
outlaw and like the wolf as it looms outside the law and is above the
law (and thus, Schmitt would assert, is making law). Like God, like the
wolf, it does not speak our language and will respond to us neither when
we inquire after it (“what are you? where are you? how many of you
are there?”) nor when we wish to enter into covenant with it, i.e. hold it
accountable. As such, it can make decisions and be ‘the Decider’ for
itself and its subjects with impunity, even if illegally, only because it has
no capacity for an exchange. “If one cannot make a convention with the
beast,” Derrida submits,
any more than with God, it is for a reason of language. The
beast does not understand our language, and God cannot
respond to us, that is cannot make known to us, and so we
cannot know in turn if our convention is or is not accepted by
him. (55)
This irresponsibility is, according to Derrida, the direct consequence
of the inability of the theo-therianthropic [god-beast-person-like] sov
ereign to communicate between subject and sovereign, to take in and
send out, to both call and respond. The exceptional sovereign cannot
respond, and this form of responselessness does not allow for responsi
bility between subjects.
Melville, perplexed and consumed by this beast-sovereign, at
tempted to divest it, reveal it and strip it of its mystery in his own ‘book
of whales.’ Moby-Dick is more cetological (the study of whales) com
mentary than narrative. It is a treatise on the slaughter and dissection
of the whale; man’s attempt at attaining mastery over the leviathan.
Like genelycology, like anthropolycology, cetology is a dubious histori
cal tracking back—historical in its taxonomic tradition and its attempt
to disconceal origins, and dubious in that these tracings are always
inferred, if not simply fables. [Agamben provides us with an interesting
moment in nautical taxonomy; “A serious scientific work such as Peter
Artedi’s Ichthiologica (1738) still listed sirens next to seals and lions,
and Linnaeus himself, in his Pan Europaeus, classifies sirens—which
the Danish anatomist Caspar Bartholin called Homo marinus—^together
with man and apes” (Agamben, 24)]. In modern archaeology, whales and
wolves even have common origins in an ancestor called therosephalian,
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‘beast-head.’ Melville’s most rigorous (though inept) attack on the levia
than that looms over him was the development of the cetological library
of Chapter 32. Here, folios and octavos become analogues for whales
and their cousins—little clinical articles to flip through—and their terror is
shown to be nothing but a common human irrationality, easily diagnosed
and set aside in the stack.
To Melville, merely showing is a revealing that can dispel that
fear of the jaws, the orality of fear. The Beast & the Sovereign begins
with the assurance “we’re shortly going to show it,” which is the epi
graph that begins La Fontaine’s poem. The Wolf & the Lamb. This poem
predicates Derrida’s ‘book of wolves’ (and Derrida’s Rogues as well,
for which the entire poem itself serves as an epigraph), and really does
show the origins of this wolfish sovereignty. This epigraph within an epi
graph on showing will serve as our taxonomy for Derrida’s wolf, both as
a matter of the wolf’s nature and how we see it (if we can see it, if it can
be revealed).
The hungry wolf comes to the river to drink and finds a lamb
taking his space. The wolf accuses the lamb of drinking his water, of
hating him, and of being protected by the dogs and shepherds that try
to kill him. The lamb’s gentle and adroit reproaches to the wolf’s fury do
not spare the child from being consumed.
La Fontaine’s wolf is always a respectful ‘Your Majesty’ to the
lamb. The “cruel beast... attracted by hunger” is completely insensitive
to the lamb’s innocence—both its new-born purity, and its guiltlessness
in each accusation that leads to its devourment—and to the rationality
of the lamb’s own defense, its logical argument. Derrida’s preferred Eng
lish translation concludes: “Deep into the wood, the wolf dragged his
midday snack. So trial and judgment stood.” Another translation (Eli Sie
gel’s) provides a textually different conclusion that is exactly the same:
“Into the woods, the wolf carries the lamb, and then eats him without
any other why or wherefore.” The absence of logic is the juridical law
appropriate to the wolf. La Fontaine thus finds his parable successful in
its epigraphic purpose: “The reason of those best able to have their way
is always the best [The strong are always best at proving they’re right]:
We now show how this is true [As we’re shortly going to show].” But
the wolf must always retreat into the woods, back into its wilderness of
exception and exile, to carry out its judgment that provides no reason
and no responsibility. This is where Derrida’s sovereign belongs. Above
the company of men, outside the city walls (those boundaries of law and
ordinance), the exceptional sovereign originates from where it acquires
its strength, suspended between beast and God.

54
https://cedar.wwu.edu/orwwu/vol1/iss1/5

10

Lawrence: Between: Place & Sovereign

Between: Place & Sovereign

The genealogical process of showing origins doubles in impor
tance for Derrida when he proclaims the “very definition, vocation, or
essential claim of sovereignty. [That is:] the sovereign always says or im
plies: even if I am not the first to do or say so, I am the first or only one
to know and to recognize who will have been the first” (92). To afford
the sovereign a mastered position by exclusion, the sovereign declares
Its preemptive originality, a first above firsts. Not doing, not saying, and
never responding, the sovereign we are reaching for via the taxonomic,
genealogical method (that we attempt to name and show to gain power
over) is consistently elusive. Though we know where It is, or at least
to where it must retreat, what do we know about this looming fable?
Perhaps we need take only one step further to the poet who Informed
the West of origins and transformations, Ovid, and his first wolf: King
Lycaon.
Before Jove/Jupiter/Zeus even begins to groaningly recount
“the wicked revels of Lycaon’s table” (Ovid, 8) and the guilt for which
the Father of the Gods has held his host accountable, Lycaon-turnedwolf has already “fled In terror, reaching the silent fields” (10). Zeus is
the god of hospitality and must test that quality in men always, coming
to their doors in disguise and then revealing himself after that moment
of either welcome or hostility (that moment Derrida calls ‘hostipitality’).
Upon receiving the divine guest. King Lycaon decides upon hostility, and
it is never clear why (‘without any other why or wherefore’). Even after
Jove reveals himself, his royal host attacks and abuses his divine guest,
mirroring that test of hostipitality by fruitlessly testing the mortality of
Jove. Enraged, the Thunderer transforms King Lycaon’s arms into legs,
and robes into fur, “yet he is still Lycaon, the same grayness, the same
fierce face... a picture of bestial savagery” (10; emphasis mine). Lycaon’s
metamorphosis reveals what will always be consistent: the sovereignty
that befits the man and the wolf, with the same face and thus the same
mouth (he does not forget to slaughter some sheep before his departure
into the field!). Lycaon’s primary affront to Jove is the meal he is served:
a hostage of Lycaon’s, boiled alive. This feeding a guest to a guest, this
slaughter of a political hostage, who should always be protected by his
host, is what really reveals our first wolf. The sovereign that is indistin
guishable from the wolf has its strength in exception, but it will always
fail the divinely-necessitated duty of hospitality in its insensibility. We
have tracked him down and it seems that without dignity (taking-in and
accepting guests), unworthy of God’s respect or ours, and always going
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back to that place of wolves, those woods, this first-wOlf-king is the
original sovereign of just that: wolves, not men. Wolves make as terrible
hosts as they seem to do guests.
§5 The Feast-Gift
Jove’s test of hospitality, which Lycaon failed, calls into ques
tion the acceptability and divinity of the exceptional sovereign. It fol
lows that the constitution of acceptability may be found in those who
pass the test. Keep in mind that Jove, the patron of hospitality, was also
the deity of law, public places (fountains), and sanctuary. Outlaws who
invoked the name of Jove could afford protection under the law. In one
of his most memorable tests of hospitality, Ovid tells us in Book 8 of
the Metamorphoses, Jove disguises himself as a wayward mortal and
approaches the doors of home after mortal home. With him he takes
his son, Hermes. The Winged God is both the shepherd and the thief
of herds, and notably the deity of reports, messages, lies, orators, and
boundaries. Father and son find welcome only in the home of Baucis
and Philemon, the poorest and final destination of these vagrant deities.
The aged husband and wife feed their veiled guests (having possibly al
ready recognized their divinity) their last and only goose. Their reward of
shared eternal life as trees intertwined makes their story one of the most
touching and rhetorical fables of hospitality in classical literature.
Abrahamic and Medieval Christianity is also concerned with any
possible arrival of visitors who could be divine (e.g. Abraham’s visitation
in Genesis 18, or Flaubert’s The Legend of St. Julian the Hospitator).
“Love thy neighbor” should prepare the host to receive Christ at any
moment, no matter his shape. Looming here is another kind of orality
that has to do with reports, the meal (Christ, who is eaten of each week,
is a real Host), and boundaries. Perhaps we may find here the sovereign
that is acceptable to us, one that allows for both taking and giving in an
orality of hospitality. Even in nonresponse, what kind of sovereign can
facilitate a responsibility in men that provides hospitality between them?
Genealogy (genelycology), tracking back, tracing back, and find
ing origins was crucial to placing Derrida’s exceptional sovereign, so it is
proper to take a similar historical route in the search of this acceptable
sovereign. Archaeologist David W. Anthony specializes in the postulated
Proto-Indo-European culture of the Caucuses which he reveals and
defends in his work The Horse, Wheel, and Language. This is the culture
that mothered our language and all of its cousins and siblings, to which
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the West believes it is indebted for its cultural origins and teleologies
(read: ‘Caucasian’). Using archaeological rigor and this reconstructed
maternal language, thousands of years older than ours, Anthony empha
sizes the importance of the haunting root *ghos-ti-, the doubled guesthost, in that culture. He says:
Guest-host relationships would have been very useful for
a mobile herding economy, as a way of separating people
who were moving through your territory with your assent
from those who were unwelcome, unregulated, and therefore
unprotected. (303)
Humanity in grasslands and deserts requires hospitality both for survival
and to define borders. Over and over, Anthony repeats the significance
of the guest-host and also the gift. Gifts
were not only signs of acceptance and Teleologies: A final
a display of wealth—they were obliga
cause, ultimate design,
tions of the host/lord. With the inven
or oveniding value.
tion of significant mobile property (i.e.
E.g. The idea that hap
herded livestock) came “new rituals
piness should be maxi
and a new kind of leadership, one that
threw big feasts and shared food when mized
the deferred investment paid off’’ (155).
Those with the most food or property
represented the institution of chiefdom, and it was always their role to
feast. Unless they gave in their taking, their subjects would not ac
cept them. Without the feast-meal, there was no sovereign lord. Soon,
feasting became a ritual of establishing authority, and may have, in later
times, turned from a feasting of the people into a feasting on the people
and their resources.
§6 Betweenness
Not far southeast of the Caucuses lies Afghanistan. A Scots
man named Rory Stewart walked the West-East breadth of that country
in 2002, going from village to snowy village and quietly crossing ethnic
and political boundaries. In desert-llke Afghanistan’s winter, Stewart
found himself so often alone in great between-places: between civiliza
tion (Herat to Kabul), between one village and the next, between life and
death, and between one encounter with men and another. Surviving on
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the hospitality of villagers and warlords he found that walking forward
was always a matter of relating what is behind.
Everyone had memorized a chant of names [of hosts, usually
warlords] and villages along footpaths in every direction... I
recited and followed this song-of-the-places-in-between as
a map. I chanted it even after I had left the villages, using the
list as a credential. Almost everyone recognized the names,
even from a hundred kilometers away. Being able to chant
them made me half-belong—reassuring hosts who were not
sure whether to take me in, and suggesting to anyone who
thought of attacking me that I was linked to powerful names.
(190)
Without recalling, remembering, and reaffirming that which is
behind him with names, chants, and letters of vouching, Stewart would
not have made the journey. This betweenness is power and protection
in the oral society, the society of the orality of hospitality. From wher
ever Stewart had been came the authority he brought with his arrival, an
authority recognized by and between those who spoke it, originating not
out of a sovereignty of fear but one of obligation. Fear was not without
place in this place-between-places, but when Stewart found welcome
he was, of course, fed. Then he was out of danger. Stewart shared gifts
and accepted shelter. At times, Stewart must invoke Muslim law to per
suade those he encountered not to attack him, or to aid him—in doing
so he obliquely reminded them of God’s edict of hospitality. The ‘power
ful names’ that loomed over could be said to loom a pas de loup (“there
is no wolf... only a word”), held in suspension until sprung or spoken
to the next prospective host; however, the names were not sources of
original authority. He never names a king, only peers—fellow hosts who
are also fellow warlords. The naming of names invokes a cultural author
ity, a sovereignty between men who are between places (in the desert)
and who seem beholden to nothing except what is between them, and
to God, the arbiter of hospitality.
To returning to the right of life and death possessed by Rous
seau’s persona ficta, the subject becomes bound to the sovereign not
because of fear but “because his life is no longer the bounty of nature
but a gift he has received conditionally from the state” (79). In a sense,
the sovereign of the Social Contract takes life and can give it again be
cause it is given life by a constant reaffirmation by its corporate
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constituents, and they accept what they fabricate because it arises
from between them. The artificial leviathan ceases being the mysticetus,
the whale that terrifyingly haunts with gaping mouth just beneath dark
waves, and becomes a body that feeds itself [“In the days of the Mes
siah the righteous... will feast on the meat of Leviathan and Behemoth”
(Agamben, 1)]. Between each of these people who meet and assemble
to speak and share meals and report of what is behind and what is to
come is a betweenness that has sovereignty. Said sovereign is not a fel
low citizen, but is between-fellows.
Taxonomically, the anthropological machine serves as a mode
for differentiating man from wolf, subject from sovereign, human from
inhuman. The exclusive sovereign relies on this differentiation for power.
To function, Agamben says, the machine must suspend two terms to be
forumlated: human and inhuman. In doing so, it differentiates and sepa
rates. Agamben’s intention is to grind the “ironic apparatus” to a halt by
bringing that suspension into suspension. The result is an undifferenti
ated relation that carries with it power, or mastery:
In the reciprocal suspension of these two terms [human & in
human], something for which we perhaps have no name and
which is neither animal nor man settles in between nature and
humanity and holds itself in the mastered relation. (83)
Most importantly for us, Agamben has, in this issue of what is human
and what is inhuman (not our subject, though closely related in the
overlapping issues of power and taxonomic identification), revealed that,
“what is decisive here is only the ‘between,’ the interval, or we might
say, the play between the two terms” (83). For Derrida, the sovereign is
the first of firsts, and thus it holds a mastered position. But Agamben in
forms us how betweenness is the mastered relation which it is between
and undifferentiates man and animal, God and man, or man and man.
A bestial sovereign is suspended and fails when the terms of it beingbeast versus being-man or being-God are, themselves, suspended.
This sovereign of betweenness does not need a position from which
to exercise power because it’s “where” is always wherever its power is
relevant, when there is a relationship of terms or subjects.
§7 Acceptable
Held in suspension, in betweenness, the acceptable sovereign
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looms because it is an insensible sovereign, but not quite “the insen
sible wolf.” We have tracked it back to its place and it is not the woods
outside the city but it is a no-place, a place-in-between, like an agree
ment between two people. It is before and after, around and within, it is
very concerned with borders and boundaries because it must always
be relative to those delineations. Derrida’s wolf passes over borders,
wantonly ignoring in its illicit movements. The acceptable sovereign
crosses borders but in doing so generates energy across them, like the
semi-permeable cell membrane over which ions and charges exchange.
This is the sovereign to which dignity refers, absolutely silent in its
nonresponse (not even a grunt, not even a sign). Taking and accepting
are proper to it because it bestows that exchange upon its subjects over
whom it has authority.
Derrida’s sovereign, with a wolfish head, cannot respond to us.
The acceptable sovereign simply is without a response, especially to
such inquiries as: ‘What are you?’ ‘Where are you?’ ‘How many of you
are there?’ Making betweens is the business of this sovereign—setting
up borders of propriety and of law through an orality of collective agree
ment. Not in mediating with God or sleeping with wolves, but in medi
ating between men and gods and wolves and mastering their relativity
does it have power over them and under them.
The savior, as we have seen, neither takes nor accepts, and in
so doing transcends. The exceptional sovereign takes and accepts, but
accepts only for itself—^taking and accepting-as-taking. This is a one
way relationship, removing the sovereign from being relative to others:
excluding it and rendering it without a between to go to, so it can only
flee to the woods and fields. The acceptable sovereign takes and ac
cepts by virtue of allowing its subjects the opportunity for hospitable
exchange. A proper host treats and feasts his hostages well. Worthy of
men by making men worthy, this sovereign falls Into rank between ranks
and as such Is still unranked but among the ranks (place that is no
place). Looming because it is always there and not there and cannot be
shown, it is without proper origin.
Maybe our first acceptable sovereign would be Gllgamesh, the
king who goes between life and death and returns to his city to accept
his place with some hard-learned dignity and some pride. Impossibly
one-third divine, of cow and man, once wild and sexual but conclusively
a sovereign of men who is everywhere: “he [simultaneously] leads the
way In the vanguard, / [and] he marches at the rear, defender of his
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comrades” (4). He built the walls of Uruk, that place between Uruk and
not-Uruk, which he shows to Ur-Shanabi with satisfaction upon his
return from the world between death and life.
As Derrida says, let’s not forget the wolves, that “there Is no wolf
[pas de loup] yet where things are looming a pas de loup.” It may appear
as though the sovereign were a wolf because Its shadow may be mis
construed as four-legged, and some fabulous bugbear is invented. But
really, we never see nor hear what is truly stealthy. Like the lack of echo
In the desert, there Is absolutely no response. The critique is that the
sovereign is only misconceived to be above the law and humanity. In
stead it is between law and humanity, between laws and between men.
This betweenness is where the absolute sovereignty originates without
origin, and where it can be found though it is entirely insensible. The
purpose of its nonresponse is to facilitate the necessary, and divinely
ordained, hospitality between its subjects.

Fig. 3: “Day seven, from right: Abdul Haq,
the author, Mullah Mustafa (commandant
of Obey) shortly after he shot at us and just
before Abdul Haq’s departure.” (Stewart)
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Fig. 4: Places in between: Rory Stewart
& host Aziz. (Stewart)
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